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ABSTRACT
Hall has pointed out that, when there is perfect competition and
price flexibility, labor hoarding alone will not induce the Solow
residual measured using labor's share in revenues to be procyclical.
We show that, even with perfect competition, a small amount of price
rigidity -weassume firms must set price slightly before the level of
demand becomes known -makesthe extent of procyclical productivity
depend mainly on the extent of labor hoarding. We show that indeed,
whether productivity is measured via the Solow method using labor's
share in revenues or using other methods, it tends to be more
procyclical in industries and in nations where labor hoarding is more
important.
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Introduction
Thephenomenon of procyclical physical productivity in the face
of wars and other demand shocks has long been recognized. Businessmen
have always appreciated the benefits of cyclical expansion; they are
able to use their capacity more fully and so their costs per-unit
fall. Countless empirical studies have demonstrated that increases in
labor input over the business cycle are associated with more than
proportional increases in output.1 The appropriate interpretation of
the procyclicality of various productivity measures has long been a
matter of debate among economists and has attracted renewed interest
since the work of Hall (1987, 1988).
This paper seeks to rehabilitate both theoretically and
empirically an idea that has gone somewhat out of fashion--the notion
that procyclical productivity regardless of how measured arises
because it is costly for firms to adjust their capacity and so
capacity utilization (both in terms of labor and capital) fluctuates
over the business cycle. We believe that variations in the extent to
which productivity is procyclica]. have more to do with differences in
the extent of labor hoarding than with market power. Developing this
line of argument also leads us to a perspective on the reasons why
price often seems to exceed marginal cost in US industry which is
somewhat djfferent from Hall's.
At least since Solow (1964), economists have traditionally given
two related explanations for procyclical movements in output per man-
hour. The first holds that firms are generally operating in a region
of their cost curves where there are increasing returns to scale3
because firms must incur some fixed costs in the form of "overhead"
labor in order to operate at all. This interpretation of procyclical
productivity suggests that barriers to entry in the form of increasing
returns to scale are endemic and anything like perfect competition is
inherently impossible.
The second "labor hoarding" explanation for procyclical
productivity holds that labor input isdifficultor costly to change
in the short run. The costs of varying labor input stem not only from
the costs of hiring and firing workers but also because changing the
number of workers employed in a firm requires organizational changes
that take time. If adjusting labor input is costly, firms will
"hoard" labor during recessions so that output will decline more than
proportionally with labor input. In booms, as previously hoarded labor
comes to be utilized fully, productivity will increase. This story
unlike the preceding one, is logically consistent with firms having
constant returns to scale in the long run and pricing competitively.
Thus distinguishing the stories is of some importance.
As Solow (1964) noted, both of these explanations for procyclical
movements in output per man—hour imply that marginal costs should be
very low during recessions. If firms price competitively, one would
therefore expect to see very low prices during recessions. If there
are increasing returns to scale price would be very low, except
perhaps in booms when firms are operating at capacity. Similarly if
output is low and there is labor hoarding, marginal cost (and thus
price on the naive competitive view) must be very low since the firm
has labor which is kept employed while it is essentially idle. That
prices fail to behave in this manner is apparent not only from4
macroeconomic data but also from everyday experience.2 Airlines
charge high prices for seats in half empty planes. Hotels with vacant
rooms charge much more than the cost of cleaning a room for a night's
stay. Bookstores charge their customers twice what they pay for even
best sailing titles.
Hence, either explanation for procylical productivity must be
complemented by resolution of the pricing puzzle of why price seems to
far exceed marginal cost when there is excess capacity as in
recessions. The pricing puzzle has itself been the subject of a
voluminous literature. Twodistinctbut not mutually exclusive
explanations for the excess of prices over marginal costs during
recessions have been suggested. The first (which complements nicely
the view that there are increasing returns to scale) is that price
setters possess a great deal of market power: firms either produce
goods for which there are no good substitutes, do not effectively
compete through prices, or both.3.
The second explanation for the pricing puzzle is that prices are
in some sense rigid so that they remain at the high levels of the boom
even in the slump.4 In the presence of price rigidity, prices do not
rise sufficiently in high demand states to cover the costs of
capacity. Thus, some of these capacity costs are covered in low
demand states and, then, price exceeds marginal cost. This basic idea
is pursued at length below.
The foregoing discussion can be summarized with the help of
figure 1 which has the two puzzles on the two axes, each accompanied
by two explanations. We have inserted Hall's name in the increasing
returns—monopoly power combination because in Hall (1988) he5
explicitly embraces the idea of monopoly power and rejects price
rigidity as the explanation for the behavior of total factor
productivity. In his 1987 paper he also notes that profitability in
US industry is low: the rate of return on physical capital is not very
different from the rate of return required by investors. Taking as
given his 1988 estimates for the extent of monopoly power, constant
returns to scale cannot be reconciled with US data. He concludes that
there are always increasing returns: either firms must incur large
fixed costs to operate or firms have much excess capacity. Therefore,
labor hoarding is not itself the major determinant of the extent of
procyclical productivity.5
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In figure 1 we have associated our own names with the
opposite labor hoarding-price rigidity combination reflecting the
emphasis of the current paper. This is not to deny any role formonopoly power or increasing returns in accounting for cyclical
productivity and pricing patterns. Rather we suspect that labor
hoarding combined with inflexibilities in pricing are dominant
determinantsof thecyclical behavior of various productivity
measures. Webuttress this argument providing some preliminary
empiricalevidence suggesting that differences in the costs of
adjusting labor are veryimportant inaccountingfor variations in
thecyclicality of productivity.
Section I demonstrates the basic idea that, if prices are
rigid, they will be below marginal cost in low demand states and,
asaresult, productivity will appear procyclical as long firms
hoardlabor. Section II extends these results to thecase of
"micro" price rigidity where firmsknow thedistribution of
possibledemand realizations (whichdepends on the business
cycle), but not the actual realization before they set their
price. It turns out that price rigidity due to "micro"
uncertaintyabout the state of demand is sufficient to account for
the observed cyclical behavior of productivity.
Section III informallyreviews some empirical evidence
bearingon the relative importance of labor hoarding-price
rigidityand monopoly power-increasing returns to scale. We argue
that the former story provides the most plausible account of two
major stylized facts, that productivity is more procyclical in
industries where a larger fraction of employment consists of
nonproduction workers and the observation that productivity is far
moreprocyclical in Japan than in the United States by any
availablemeasure. Further evidence supporting our view comes7
from an examination of the dynamic response of productivity to
changes in employment. Section V concludes.
I. Keynesian Price Riaiditv
This section demonstrates our two fundamental points--that
price rigidity can explain why prices appear to exceedmarginal
cost and that price rigidity can rationalize the belief that labor
hoardingis responsible for the procylicality of productivity.
Consider an industry in which output Q cannot exceed
installed capacity Y.Adjustment is so costly that capacity is
not changed at all when demand fluctuates. Some of the costs of
capacity are undoubtedly labor costs and, for illustrative
purposes,weabstract from any other capacity costs. We thus
assumethat to produce Q units an amount of labor L equal to
(cQ+vY) must be employed. So, an amount of labor vY is hoarded
even when output is zero.This cost function implies that in the
longrun, if the firm operates at capacity, its costs are
independent of its scale. All prices are in units of labor (or
the wage is one).
Let demand be either high or low. Demand and capacity are
such that, when demand is low, less than Y is demanded at a price
equal to marginal cost c; however when demand is high more than Y
is demanded at a price of c. The competitive equilibrium for this
industry would have a price of c when demand is low and a price
such that Y is demanded when demand is high.
Supposethat thebusinesscycle is the alternation of low and8
high demand. Then, output per man hour, QJL,whosemovements in
this modelwithoutcapital correspond to the Solow residual
obtained using labor's share in costs, is clearly procyclical.
When going from low demand to high demand dQ/dL equals 1/c while
OJL equals instead 1/(c+Yv/Q). Therefore, (dOJQ)/(dL/L) is larger
than one. This captures the basic insight that while a few more
flight attendants work at peak hours than at of f peak hours on the
Eastern Air Shuttle, productivity measured as passengers carried
per employ., is much larger at peak hours. In the same way, an
extra customer walking into a store increases the productivity of
its employees. Examples like this probably provide the basis for
the widespread attribution of procyclical productivity to labor
hoarding.
However as Hall (1988) stresses, if firms price competitively
total factor productivity, or the Solow residual residual using
labor's share in revenue, will not increase in this situation. In
particular, the change in total factor productivity equals
(l/PQ)(PdQ—dL] and rises when revenues (evaluated at base prices)
rise by more than labor input. When going from low demand to high
demand this expression is clearly zero if price P equals c as it
does in the competitive equilibrium. The increased output is
valued so little that productivity does not increase. He thus
suggests that monopoly power, which raises P above c, is needed to
explain pricing behavior. As a result he is led to abandon the
notion that labor hoarding can explain the observed behavior of
productivity.
Hall's argument breaks down if prices are inflexible.9
Consider the extreme case where price is independent of demand.
Such price rigidity necessarily implies that price exceeds c, for
otherwise firmscouldnever recover their capacity costs. Any
such excess of P over c implies that (l/PQ)(PdQ—dL] increases when
demandrises.Thus with price rigidity the extra units that are
producedare valued highly, leading to an increase in measured
productivity when demandrises.
Price rigidity together withtherequirement that firms
cover their capacity costs and market power can thus generate very
similarimplications for the behavior of total factor
productivity. Whythendoes Hall (1987) deny the the role of
price rigidity with an example in which it fails to induce
procyclical productivity? The crucial difference between Hall's
example and ours is that he assumes that firms with rigid prices
always supply what is demanded at the rigid price, even when this
price is less than their marginal cost. When demand goes up, some
of demand is met by incurring very high marginal costs; the
provision of these expensive units tends to depress productivity.
In our example, by contrast, firms whose prices are rigid follow
the profit maximizing strategy of rationing consumers in high
demand states when the marginal revenue from meeting their demand
is less than the marginal cost.
There is substantial debate over the extent of price rigidity
over the business cycle. The evidence surveyed in Rotemberg (1987)
suggests that some prices do indeed remain constant for several
years lending credence to the possibilility that price rigidity
accounts for the appearance of procyclical productivity.10
Discussions of the inflation process inevitably emphasize the role
of shortages in precipitating inflation. Moreover, delivery lags,
which can be viewed as a form of rationing insofar customers are
notgetting the producttheyreally want -namely instant delivery-
at theposted price, lengthen during booms. Thissuggests that at
least some rationing is observed at cyclical peaks. Okun (1981)
feels that at strong cyclical peaks, shortages have an important
detrimental impact on resource allocation when he writes, "In boom
periods, many specific shortages last sufficientlylong.. .that
buyers make behavioral adjustments... (though) shortage phenomena
are widespread only in periods...like 1966 and 1973." (p.277).
While price rigidity over the business cycle may or may not
be important, we demonstrate in the next two sections that price
rigidity of a more plausible sort, is sufficient to generate
procyclicality in productivity and pricing above marginal costs,
even in the absence of monopoly power.
II. Micro Price Riaiditv
Within any business cycle phase there are many different
states of demand. Think of a movie theater that does not know
whether it is showing a hit or a toy manufacturer who doesn't know
whether his new offering will be the next Cabbage Patch Doll or
will flop completely. If the Wairasian auctioneer cleared the
market every second, prices would fluctuate with the state of
demand within cyclical phases. We refer to departures from
perfect peak load pricing which arise because firms must set theirprice before the state of demand is known, or are unable to
continuouslyvary prices as "micro" price rigidity.6 As we
discuss below, this is a strictly weaker and more plausible form
of price rigidity than that considered in the previous section
becauce here prices are allowed to vary with aggregate demand.
ThePrescott Modal
Considera setup dueto Prescott (1975) in which demand for a
homogeneousproduct is uncertain and competitive firms set prices
(i.e. write price tags) before the state of demand is revealed.
Customers always buy the cheap items first. They turn to high
priced items only when the cheaper ones are exhausted.7 In
equilibrium, some goods will be priced low and will sell out most
of the time, while others will have a high price and so only will
be sold in large demand states. While it will be convenient in
what follows to think of different firms as choosing different
prices, this is in no way necessary. A given firm may charge low
prices to its first few customers, and then higher to subsequent
customers, as is common in the post-deregulation US airline
industry.
Let consumers' reservation price, which does not depend on
the state of demand, equal r. What varies across states is the
amount Q they want to buy at this reservation price, in state s
they are willing to purchase g(s) where g is an increasing
function.8 The states of nature s can be taken, without loss of
generality, to be uniformly distributed between zero and one.12
There are a large number of potential firms.Riskneutral firms
choose capacity first, then quote prices and, only then, are the
states of demand realized so that sales take place.
In equilibrium there are a continuum of producing firms. For
ease of presentation we thinkofeach as charging only one price.
To describe this equilibrium we let s(P) be the state such that
for all states equal to or higher than s(P) a firm charging P
sells up to capacity. This definition implies both that an amount
g(s(P)) is supplied by firms charging P or less and that firms
charging P can expect to sell all that they can produce with
probability (l-s(P)). Therefore the expected unit profits of a
firm charging P are:
(1 —s(P))(P—C)
—V. (1)
In equilibrium, firms must break even. If losses are
realized by a firm charging P so that the expression (1) is
negative, the firms would prefer not to build capacity. If
instead, the expression in (1) is positive, more firms would build
capacity and charge P. A firm contemplating such entry can
neglect the effect of its entry on the probability of selling
because it can enter supplying only an infinitesimal amount.
Therefore in equilibrium the expression (1) must be zero for all
prices actually charged. Of course, no price below (c+v) is
charged for that would lead to losses nor is a price above r
charged for there would be no demand at this price.9
To complete the demonstration that this is an equilibrium we
now show that deviations at the pricing stage are unprofitable.
Obviously nothing is gained by charging less that c+v or more than13
r. For prices between c+v and r the proposed equilibrium in which
(1) equals zero has all firms making equal profits. So unless a
deviating firm affects the probability of selling at any
particularprice, firmaare indifferent to the price they charge.
Yet,the fact that there are a continuum of firmaensuresthat
thisdistributionis essentially unaffected by single firm
deviations.
Theequilibrium requirement that (1) bezero for all prices
charged implies that thepricecharged by each firmequalsits
averagecost.So this model is consistent with the claim of Hall
and Hitch (1939) that firms charge "full average" cost. It is
also consistent with the notion that price equals "long run"
marginalcost where long run marginal cost is appropriately
defined to recognize that the firm will not always be able to make
use of its capacity.
From (1) it is apparent that capacity which is only utilized
in the highest state of demand will only be installed if the price
paid in that state is infinite. If instead, the reservation price
r is finite, it will be charged to all states above s where s is
such that:1°
—(r—c—v)/(r-C). (2)
Rationality on the part of firms requires that the price be r
for any states where demand is not fully met. By the same token,
if r is charged to customers in states lower than those in which
industry capacity is fully used up, a firm charging r could
increase its profits by undercutting the price slightly.
Therefore s is the highest state in which demand is fully met.14
So, if total marginal cost (c+v) is kept constant while the level
of congealed costs v is increased, s falls, i.e. the number of
states whose demand is not fully met goes up.
Demand Shocksand Measured Productivity
We now consider the effects on various productivity measures
of an increase in aggregate demand which is accompanied by price
changes.Suppose in particular that the maximum consumers are
willing tobuy at r is now given by
Qg(s) +U
sothat aggregate demand increases, which raise u, raise demand by
the same amount in each state. In this model the increased demand
that results from an infinitesimal increase in u will be met for
all states below s whether prices change in response to the
increased demand or not. The reason is that, since r exceeds c,
rationing by high priced firms is never optimal so the amount
firms are willing to sell is always equal to g(*)
Iffirms are free to readjust prices the equilibriumequates
theunitprofits of firms charging different prices. Now these
unit profits given by (1) are equated to a number which differs
from zero. This number can be computed as follows. Let s'(u) be
the highest state for which demand is fully met so that g(s'(u))
equals g(s*)_u. Then by the earlier arguments r is charged by the
firms who sell only when the state equals or exceeds s'. These
firms earn unit profits equal to (s*_s1(U))(rC) and these must
also be the unit profits of firms charging other prices.15
The increased labor costs (dL)associatedwith the increased
sales from an infinitesimal increase in u, du, are given by cs*du.
LetRbe the usual index of real output obtained by valuing
outputs of different goods (namely those supplied in different
states) at the initial prices. Then the Solow residual is
procyclical if dR/dL is greater than one so that the value of
output increases more than the value of labor input. The change
in R is:
dR —duS;(s)ds —((c_k)log(1_.*)+cs*]du
where P(s) is the price charged initially by firms who sell in
states greater than or equal to s and can be obtained by inverting
(1), k equals total marginal cost (c+v), while the second equality
is obtained by using (1). Thus the ratio dR/dL is given by:
dR/dL =1-(k_c)log(l_s*)/cs*
which exceeds one. So total factor productivity is clearly
procyclical.
Consider now the effect on R/L, the ratio of the value of
output (at base prices) to man hours. Since there is free entry
and no fixed costs, the initial value of R/L is one. So changes
in R/L are given by dR/dL and are R/L is also procyclical.




The term in brackets is negative both because (k/c) exceeds
one and because log(l_s*)/s* is smaller than minus one for s16
betweenzero and one. Thus, dR/dL declines when c rises. This
means that, as costs become less congealed, as labor becomes more
variable, the extent of procyclical productivity declines. We
return to this observation below in Section IV as we tryto
distinguish empirically between different theories.
TheImnortance of Rationing
Notice that the model considered in this section exhibits the
rationing that our previous analysis suggests is necessary to
overturnHall's results. With many differentprices charged by
different firms some firms are always running out. Individuals
are rationed in the sense that they are unable to buy goods in the
goodterms that they have been obtained by others and must turn to
moreexpensive suppliers. Itis important to stress that this
formof rationing (which is all that is required) is very mild and
widespread. It is only necessary that not all individuals suceed
in buying items whenthey areon sale. Such "limited quantities"
sales can be seen advertized in any Sunday newspaper.
The extent of rationing is actually much greater than this
type of example suggests once it is recognized that in many
settingsconsumers who buy first get a higher quality product,
which is tantamount to paying a lower price. Take the case of a
movie theatre. Some seats are more desirable than others and they
fill up first. Late comers are rationed in that they must content
themselveswith worse seats. So while theprice tag on all seats
of a given showing is the same, the price per unit of intrinsic17
quality is lower for the good seats which are grabbed first.
Similarly, in an airplane, aisle and window seats go first.
While rationing can take these very mild forms in the model
we have described, the more traditional form of rationing -
customersactually unable to buy the good they wish at any price-
would emerge if reservation prices rose when demand rose (or
alternatively if demand curves sloped down throughout). Does this
form of rationing actually take place? At an informal level,
seats on airplanes are unavailable at the last minute on holiday
weekends, that rooms in hotels are unavailable during graduation
week and that not all customers get in when hit movies have their
first run. It is generally felt that those who do their Christmas
shopping early have access to a better selection. In the case of
industrial goods, early corners get relatively flexible delivery
terms while later customers may have to wait longer. Canton
(1987) gives several examples of such rationing between firms
which he, like us, interprets as due to the rigidity of prices.
More quantitative evidenc& is presented in Progressive Grocer
(1968) which reports that, on average, 12.2% of major brand items
carried by supermarkets are out-of-stock at any point in time.
The Nielsen study which forms the basis for this calculation also
indicates that 30 percent of customers at the typical store are
unable to purchase all the items on their shopping lists. It also
reports that the rate of stockouts varies significantly over the
course of the week. A Chicago study found that 17% of frozen food
items were not available to consumers on Monday and that 12% were
missing on Wednesday and 11% on Friday. Interestingly, while the18
article devotes considerable attention to the problem of
minimizing stockouts, theideaof raising prices on items that are
in short supply is never mentioned. The article also mentions
that one fifth of the individuals who find the item they want
missing refuse to substitute.
Themodel developed in this section demonstrates that
procyclical productivity and the appearance of price in excess of
marginal cost when demand s low can arise in a perfectly
competitive setting. We want to stress that these results follow
merelyfrom the need of firms with rigid prices to recover some of
their capacity costs in low states of demand and does not depend
on the precise formulation of our model. To provide some evidence
for the robustness of our logic we present in the Appendix a model
in which products are differentiated and there is monopolistic
competition. That model lacks the not always realistic
implication of te Prescott model that different firms charge
different prices for exactly the same good.
In the model of the Appendix price exceeds marginal cost even
with flexible prices so productivity using labor's share in
revenues is a1waPs procyclical. Nonetheless we demonstrate that
this measure of productivity becomes even more procyclical when
prices are rigid across states of nature within a business cycle
phase. This model alaso allows us to demonstrate a variant of the
point in Hall (1987). we show that the Solow residual measured
using labor's share in cost (which in our model corresponds to the
naive measure of labor productivity) is not procyclical with
flexible prices even with labor hoarding and monopoly power. On19
the other hand and in line with the results presented above,
inflexible prices make this measure of productivity more
procyclical the more important is the hoarding of labor.
III Eirical Evidence
In this section we discuss how various measurements of the
behavior of productivity militate in favor of our interpretation
of procyclical productivity. We consider in turn the behavior of
productivity across industries, across nations, the response of
productivity to changes in different factors and the dynamic
behavior of productivity when output changes.
Productivity across Industries
The relative importance of the two theories we have
contrasted can be gauged by seeing whether, across industries, the
procyclicality of productivity is related more to indicators of
market power or to indicators of labor hoarding. One indicator of
labor hoarding in an industry is the extent to which it employs
non-production workers. Comparing industries with different
fractions of nonproduction workers sheds light on the role of
labor hoarding because employment of nonproduction workers varies
much less; these workers tend to be hoarded in recessions. A
regression of Hall's (1986) measures of the procycality of
productivity for 18 2-digit manufacturing industries on their
ratio of nonproduction workers to employment in 1960 gives:20
Procyc.96 +3.42*nonprod/emp R224
(.37) (1.51)
where standard errors are in parenthesis. Figure 2 presents a
plot of our data (with the SIC code for the two digit industry
next to each point) as well as of the fitted line obtained from
our regression.




In contrast to what one would expect under the market power
view, the indicator of such power C4 has essentially nothing to do
with the procyclicality of productivity and does not affect the
importance of the ratio of nonproduction workers to employment.
The lack of importance of concentration is confirmed by Blanchard
(1987) and by the much larger study of Domowita, Hubbard and
Petersen (1986).
Productivityacross Nations
Table1 illustrates that Solov residual measured relative to
revenues is more procyclical in Japan than in the United States.11
The difference between the two sets of estimates is both
economically and statistically significant. These regressions are
obtained by using output growth in the US and Europe as
instruments to obtain the estimates for Japan while output growth
in the US and Europe are used as instruments to obtain estimates
for the US. While it is conceivable that this result obtains21
because Japan is more monopolistic than the US, it is easy to
interpret this finding in light of the labor hoarding-rigid prices
box. Given the dependence of Japanese manufacturing on export
markete it is implausible that it is far more heavily monopolized
than American manufacturing. On theotherhand, institutional
differences promoting lifetime employment, and pressuring firms to
retain workers during recessions are widely recognized.
Consider again the labor hoarding-rigid price box. According
to this set of explanatione, not only total factor productivity,
but also output per man—hour should be more procyclical in
countries such as Japan where labor is more fixed in the short
run. The fact that Japan's output per man-hour is indeed more
procyclical is well knownandcan be seen in table 2.
Note that the preceding section demonstrates that labor
hoarding per se cannot account for the cyclicality of output per
man hour unless there are rigid prices. Thus the fact that output
per man-hour in Japan is more procyclical would have to be
attributed to greater increasing returns to scale if the
assumption of price flexibility is maintained. If, instead, micro
price rigidity is recognized, Japan's productivity pert omance on
both measures can be linked to the institutions that lead to
greaterlabor hoarding.
Productivity Movements with Several Factors
When several factors of production are analized at once, the
market power explanation for procyclicalproductivity has an22
additional testable implication. Any increase in inputs should be
accompanied by the same increase in productivity once due account
is taken of their respective share in revenue. An instrumental
variable regression of output growth on the rates of growth of
inputs multiplied by their respective factor shares would give the
same coefficient on each input and this coefficient could be
interpreted as the ratio of price to marginal cost.
Using data on various inputs and imposing the equality of
these coefficients leads Domowitz, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) to
estimates of the ratio of price to marginal cost which differ from
Hall's (who concentrates on labor input alone). Yet, Griliches
(1987) shows that the data reject the equality of these
coefficients. While increases in energy and materials do not
raise total factor productivity, increases in labor do. While we
do not present a fully worked out model in which different inputs
vary over time, the Griliches findings seem at least broadly
consistent with our story. According to this story, prices exceed
marginal cost (which makes productivity procyclical) only because
the full cost of the quasi—fixed factors is incorporated in the
price even in the slump.
Dynamic Response of Productivity to Demand
The response of productivity over time to changes in output
suggests that procyclical physical productivity is due at least to
some extent to labor hoarding and that increasing returns to scale
cannot be the whole story. In the two studies where output data23
are measured in physical units (Hultgren (1960) and Fair (1969))
there is evidence that asoutput expands productivityfirst rises
and then, at least for many industries, falls. This is consistent
with the idea that it takes time to change the quasi-fixed labor
inputs. On the other hand it would seem that withpure increasing
returneto scale, productivity would keep rising (as it does for
some individual industries). This would not n.c.ssarily be true
ifentry by new firmsoccurred inresponseto the expansion but
theamountoftime it takes for productivity to startfalling
makes this particularexplanation difficult to believe.
Moreevidence along these lines is obtained if it is accepted
that price is independent of state so that measures of aggregate
industry output actually correspond to measures of physical units.
BothSims (1974) and Gordon (1979) uce aggregate data on
manufacturing output and labor input to describe the time series
properties of conventional labor productivity. They conclude that
expansions raise productivity but that productivity tends to
revert towards its normal level. Gordon (1979), in particular,
shows that this reversion is more prevalent at the end of
expansions.
Figure 3 use monthly data on US manufacturing over the period
1962 to 1985 to evaluate the response of productivity to demand
impulses as proxied either by increases in manhours or output.12
The result which appear robust to whether the equation is
estimated using first differences or levels, confirm earlier
results suggesting that productivity rises and then falls
following demand impulses as would be expected if labor was24
hoarded.
IV. Conclusions
The results in this paper suggest that traditional analyses
emphasizing the costs of adjusting capacity and labor hoarding
capture important aspects of productivity behavior. In
conjunction with plausible degrees of price rigidity, labor
hoarding can account for the observed cyclical behavior of various
productivity measures.
At this point it is difficult to gauge precisely the relative
importance of the labor hoarding—price rigidity story that we have
stressed and the increasing returns—monopoly power story stressed
by Hall. In future research it would be valuable to extend our
comparison of the United States and Japan to embrace other
countries. The variables constructed by Lazear (1987) in his
study of employment security rules might be useful proxies for the
costs of labor adjustment. Measuring monopoly power is likely to
be more difficult. One plausible strategy would involve studying
the cyclicality of productivity in different countries for
industries that produce for world markets. This would at least
crudelyhold the degree of monopoly power constant.
different approach would involve more detailed
investigation of thedynamics of productivity movements. Any
satisfactoryresolution of the productivity and pricing paradoxes
should account for the dynamic pattern of productivity's response
to labor input—-rising sharply then falling as labor input25
increas.s. This see5 more naturally consistent with the labor
hoarding view, though rationalizations involving increasing
returns are probably possible.26
FOOTNOTES
1Two studies that use physical output data are Hultgren (1960) and
Fair (1969). Many other studies use more aggregated output figures
which are obtained using prices to obtain value indices. The analysis
of procyclical movements in these somewhat different measures of
productivity is somewhat more delicate as we show below.
2That marginal cost, on the other hand, is low in recessions has
also been documented by Fay and Medoff (1985).
3This view was clearly espoused by Robinson (1932) when she wrote:
"There are two factors which will lead to a rise in price when demand
falls. If marginal costs are falling, the reduction in output (due to
the fall in demand) will raise marginal cost. ..Andif demand becomes
less elastic as it falls there will bs a tendency for the price to be
raised"
4Modelling prices as markups on standard or normal unit labor costs
rather than on current labor costs is a long tradition in work on
price equations. An extreme version of the rigid price view is
expressed by Hall and Hitch (1939) who after conducting interviews
with thirty eight entrepreneurs on price policy concluded that "an
overwhelming majority. .. thoughta price based on full average cost was
the "right" price".
5Hall (1988) recognizes that his use of the procyclicality of the
Solow residual to measure the excess of price over marginal cost can
be biased towards "rejecting competition" in the presence of labor
hoarding for two reasons. First, with labor hoarding, output may fall
less in recessions than measured in the NIPA if what workers produce
in the s1uin is some form of unmeasured investment. Second, with
labor hoarding, the fall in actual labor input in the recession may be
larger than the measured fall in man—hours of work. For a variety of
reasons he dismisses the empirical importance of these measurement
errors.
6This is the kind of price rigidity commonly employed in the
literature on inventories. See Kahn (1987) for example.
7For a related model in which goods are perfect substitutes before
the customer chooses which firm to purchase from but where purchasing
from a second firm is impossible if the chosen firm has run out see
Canton (1978).
8The assumption of a fixed reservation price that does not vary is
not necessary for our results about the behavior of productivity. It
does simplify the exposition and as stressed by Prescott allows the
market optimum to be attained even when prices must be set before
demand is revealed.
9This model is formally almost identical to Butters (1977). In the27
Butters model,unitproductioncostsequalcwhereasvcorrespondsto
thecost of sending an ad to a single customer. Equilibrium then
requiree thatan expression such as (1)be zero for prices between c+v
andthereservation price r where (l-s(P)3 is the equilibrium
probability that an ad of price P will be the ad with the lowest price
received by the customer and will thus lead to a sale.
10Equation (2) also gives themaximum state which is fully served
with flexible prices. This fact, which lies behind Prescott's (1975)
demonstration that capacity is efficiently chosen even with rigid
prices, can be understood as follows, With flexible prices the price
is c unless demand excees capacity; at that point the price jumps to
r. The probability (1-s )ofreceiving r must be such that capacity
costs v are covered. This is what (2) requires.
11The regressions in table 1 are estimated using data on
manufacturing output, labor input and labor compensation provided by
Robert Gordon and described in Gordon (1987).
12The figures are obtained by first running regressions of
productivity either on man-hours or on output. Then, we simulate how
productivity would respond to a permanent change in either man-hours
or output.28
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TABLE1
PROCYCLICAL MOV(ENTS OF TOTAL
FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY INMANUFACTURING
a)Regressions of output growth on labor share times san-hour growth





























labor share times san—hour growth on output growth




























Note: Dum73 is a variable which takes the value of zero
and one thereafter. Data are provided by Robert Gordon






a) Regressions of output growth on san—hourgrowth
Specification 1 2 3 4 5
Sample period: 62—84 62—84 62—84 62—72 73—84
Additional
Regressors: trend dum73
US 1.20 1.25 1.30 2.40 1.19
(.17) (.21) (.22) (2.1) (.15)
Japan 1.92 1.80 1.61 —3.82 1.67
(.39) (.42) (.40) (10.1) (.21)







1 2 3 4 5
62—84 62—84 62—84 62—72 73—84
trend dum73
.83 .90 .94 .36 .81
(.12) (.15) (.16) (.36) (.10)
.41 .43 .40 —.10 .59
(.09) (.10) (.10) (.33) (.07)
Note: Dum73 is a variable which takes the value of zero before 1973
and one thereafter. Data are provided by Robert Gordon and are
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Considermonopolistically competitive firms similar to those
studied by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) facing individual demand
functions given by:
Q —suD(P) (Al)
where Q is the quantity demanded and P is the price charged, D is a
decreasing function while s and u are again indicators of the state
of demand. The level of u in principle depends also on the price
charged by other firms in the industry. The state s has a
probability density function f(s) with support given by [s1,s'].




where P(s) is the price in state 5.
FlexiblePrices
Suppose first that prices can be varied from state to state.
Optimal prices are then given by:
D +D'(P(s)—C)—o (A3)
if the solution to this equation satisfies usD(P(s)) Y and equal.
to:
usD(P(s)) —I (A4)
otherwise. This is the standard "peak-load" pricing solution. For
states up to a critical state 5r, prices are constant and equal to
marginal cost c times €/E—1 whereisthe elasticity of demand atA2
this optimal price. For states above 8r, price is set so that
exactly the level of capacity is demanded. It is never worthwhile
to set price below the level that clears the market so rationing is
never observed.




where the first term can be thought of as the difference between
revenues and costs in the unconstrained states while the others
represent this difference in the constrained states.





where the elasticity of demand e(P(s)) depends on s because it can
depend on P.
This standard peak load pricing model can only account for high
prices when there is excess capacity if demand is quite inelastic.
Inflexible Prices
If firms cannot vary prices with the state s, their optimal
price is obtained by setting P(s) equal to P in (4) and
differentiating
(51sf(s)]U(D+D'(PC)3 +(1_F(s*)]Y 0. (A7)A3
where s is the state at which demand is just met and equals
K/uD(P). The second order conditions require that this expression
be decreasing in P. This implies that the optimal price exceeds the
flexible price in the unconstrained states as determined by (A3).
Perhaps surprisingly, increases in capacity raise the optimal
price. This is a consequence of the fact that increases in '1 raise
the importance of the capacity constrained regime in which increases
in price are desirable. Note also that it is never optimal to sell
Y in all states since, in this case, the derivative of profits with
respect to price is strictly positive.
Now consider the optimal choice of capacity itself when prices
are constant accross states. Differentiating (A2) with respect to Y
and setting to zero (the effect of changes in I on P can be
neglected by the envelope theorem):
(l_F(s*)](P_C) —v—0. (A8)
This expression establishes that, if Vispositive, (l_F(s*)]
must be positive as well. So, at least some states must have
rationed customers. It is instructive to note that as the
elasticity of demand (which is determined by D') approaches
infinity, the price charged by the firm approaches c+v which may be
thought of as long run marginal cost. Thus the idea that firms
price at long run rather than short run marginal cost which makes no
sense from the point of view of standard theory is logical if
constraints preclude the adjustment of prices to changing demand
conditions.
using the definition of s to substitute for I in (A7) it is
apparent that equations (Al) and CM) give values of P and s whichA4
are independent of U.Thishas several consequences. Suppose first
that the number of firms is fixed and think of changes in u as being
permanent changes in demand. When capacity adjusts to this change
in demand, i.e. in the long run, Y, output and the other inputs all
rise proportionately. This means that, while an increase in demand
will in the short run raise labor productivity, i.e. there will be
short run increasing returns to labor, in the long run labor
productivity is constant. In other words, as firma adjust their
capacity optimally, labor productivity falls.
Now suppose that there is entry and exit. One way of capturing
this entry and exit is via changes in u. When new firms enter,
there is less demand for existing firms and u falls. One can
imagine that there are also fixed costs of setting up firms and that
these adjustments in u take place until there are no profits to be
earned in the industry. Note again that these adjustment do not
affect either price or the probability of being rationed. So, for
instance, if there are large fixed costs of setting up a firm, u
will in equilibriun have to be quite large. Each firm will have to
sell a large quantity to cover its fixed costs. Note however, that
our model is consistent with the absence of any such fixed costs.
Constant returns to scale and free entry can coexist with
monopolistic competition in the sense that each firm faces a
downwards sloping demand.
Exlaininp Procyclical Productivity
In this section we show that the rigidity of prices acrossA5
states s tends to make productivity as measured either using labor's
share in costs or its share in total output procyclical in response
to changes in u. We start our discussion by showing that, in either
case, sales rise in previously unconstrained states when u rises.
For the case of flexible prices this is immediate from (A5) since
the price in the unconstrained states remains the sane and demand
increases. The same would be true under fixed prices if prices did
not respond to u. We now show that when state noncontingent prices
respond optimally to u, sales rise as well.
For total sales not to change prices would have to increase so
much that uD, and thus s, remain unchanged. Note that the price
increases of other firmsinresponse to the increased demand have
the effect of raising ufurther. From (A7) it is apparent that if
pricesrose by such a large amount, firmswould wantto lower them.
This can be seen as follows. At the original equilibrium (D+D'(P—
c)) is negative since [l_F(s*)]Y is positive. Thus the the increase
in u (at an unchanged *) lowers the expression in(Al). Moreover
any increase in the firm's price has, itself, a negative effect on
(D+D'(P-c)]. Therefore such large price increases render the
derivative of profits with respect to price negative. Firms raise
their price less and total sales increase.
Inorder to determine whetherfirms whose price does not depend
on s will respond to an increase in u by lowering or raising prices,
we differentiate (7) with respect to u at unchanged prices and
obtain:
(fsf(s) ](D+D'(P—c)]s2D' (P—c).A6
The first term in this expression is negative while the second
is positive. Thus the optimal response of prices to changes in
demand is ambiguous. If the first term dominates, prices fall
instead of rising. The reason for this ambiguity is that, when
demand increases, more is sold in the unconstrained states and in
these states thederivativeof profits with respect to price is
negative. On the other hand, as demand increases, there are more
states in which the capacity constraint is binding and this promotes
increases in price. This provides a possible rationalization for
thepro-cyclicalityof real wages. If prices fall during
expansions, real wages will appear to be pro-cyclical.
With flexible prices sales only increase in the states in which
the firmischarging ce/(e-l) so that when state contingent prices
are used to measure industry output dR/dL is simply €/(c-l). So as
Hall points out, his measurement of procyclical productivity
corresponds to market power in the usual sense of absence of
substitutes.
Whenprices donot vary with s, dR/dL is equal to PdQ/dL where
dQ is the total change in output. Moreover, dQ/dL is still equal to
1/c.Yet, as we mentioned under equation (9), the price exceeds
cc/(e-1), so that dR/dL exceeds e/(—1). That is, an analyst who in
the presence of price inflexibility naively inferred the extent to
which firms compete through price or the extent to which firms
producegoods with good substitutes from the cyclicality of the
Solowresidual measuredusing labor's share invalue would
understatethe importance of competitive forces.
Intheconstant elasticity case dR/dL equals:A7
c/CE —1+[l_F(s*)]/[115f(S)dS])
As e becomes large, so that conditions become competitive, s
tends to 51 so that the difference between dR/dL and i/Cc—i) rises.
Consider now changes in the capacity costs v keeping k, total
marginal cost fixed. For v equal to zero, s is infinite and dR/dL
is simply c/(c—l) while it is clearly larger for positive v. We
have not derived necessary conditions for dR/dL to be strictly
increasing in v but some tedious algebra establishes that it is true
for linear demand and nonconcave F.
A more dramatic contrast highlighting the importance of price
rigidities for the study of productivity emerges from a comparison
of Solow residuals when these are computed using factor shares in
cost rather than factor shares in revenue. Since labor is the only
factor of production here, its cost share is one. Thus Solow
residuals measured in this way will be procyclical if the naive
measure of labor productivity R/L is procyclical. We show that the
ratio R/L will be procyclical if prices are rigid while it need not
exhibit any cyclical pattern whatever if prices are flexible.
Consider first the case of inflexible prices. Since base
period prices do not depend on s the change in revenues over labor
input is proportional to the change in physical output per labor
input. In particular,
(dR/R)/(dL/L) —1+v/cLfsf(s)ds/s*+(l_F(s*))](A9)
which clearly exceeds one if v is positive. From (A7) it is
apparent that if there is no quasi-fixed labor (Viszero),
productivity is not cyclical while if all costs are congealed Cc isA8
zero) (dP/R)/(dWL) is infinite. It can be shown that, at least for
the case of linear demand, (dR/R)/(dWL) monotonically increases
with v as long as k is kept constant.
Letusnow consider the case of flexible prices. We show that,
in the presence of peak-load pricing, theratioof the value of
output (at base prices) to labor input need not be procyclical even
when thereis somelabor fixity in the short run. This result is
analogous to Hall's (1987) conclusion that under constant returns to
scale and optimal capacity choice the Solow residual using shares in
cost should be acyclical. Our result differs somewhat in that, for
our cost function, the variability in prices across states within
the period used for mesuring revenue and labor inputis crucialfor
the result while this variability is inessential for the cost
functions employed in Hall (1987).
We have already shown that dR/dL equals /(e—l). Labor
productivity will be procyclical if R/L is smaller than this,




L ucD(c6/(e—l) Jsf(s)ds+{J Ycf(s)ds+vY)
where revenues and costs in the unconstrained states are given by
the first terms in each expression while the terms incurly brackets
applyto the constrainedstates. Not surprisingly the ratio of the
firstterms is c/Ce—i). From (A6) it is also apparent that the
ratioof theterms in curly brackets (at the point at whichcapacity
ischosen optimally) is alsoc/Ce-i). Therefore, in the constantA9
elasticity case, R/L equals €/(c-1) and productivity is independent
of u. Suppose that, instead of being constant, the elasticity of
demand falls as s increases. This would occur if the elasticity of
demand fell when price rises (as would be the case if D(P) were
linear). The ratio of revenues to costs is then larger in the
constrained region and productivity is countercyclical. The
opposite is true if the elasticity of demand is high when demand is
high.
The basic intuition behind theresultthat labor hoarding is
insufficient, without rigid prices, to generate procyclical
movements in R/L is the following. With perfect peak-load pricing
the only states in which output rises are the excess capacity
states. While in these states price is above marginal cost, it is
still low relative to price in the constrained states. Therefore,
there is no presumption that revenues will rise more than in
proportion to labor input when output is increased in these states.